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MBB/ERNO, Bremen/W. Germany 
Frank Longhurst, Columbus System & Integration Manager 
ESA/ESTEC, Noordwijk/Netherlands 
O. ABSTRACT 
---·--
This paper .describes the Columbus Space Segment definition 
process as implement~d by European industry during Phases Bl 
and B2 in response to the requirements established by the 
European Space Agency. The development of· the .overall 
industrial structure during these phases is described, together 
with key roles and responsibilities. The approach being 
followed by industry to establish and implement the necessary 
management functions and procedures required by the European 
Space Agency to ensure adequate visibility and control of the 
programme are also addressed, as are key technical and 
managerial aspects related to commonality and overall system 
coherence .. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The European Space Station and Platform Program COLUMBUS was 
originally conceived by Italy and Germany but was set in motion 
with the adoption of the Resolution by the Council at the 
ministerial level in Rome, January 1985 and the go ahead to ESA 
to precede with ~ Space Station related "COLUMBUS Preparatory 
Program" .. 
As a consequence of that basic decisio.n, two major 
considerations ensued: 
e The Council accepted the United States offer to Europe to 
participate in a Space Station Program. 
It accepted, as the long term European Objective the 
establishment of an autonomous capability in the field of 
manned space flight• 
COLUMBUS is the largest European space effort to date. It is 
not a "one shot" project essentially complete after one launch 
but rather a large, co~plex, multi-element, international 
program, developed in a time-phased manner over a number of 
years and then operated for a virtually indefinite period of 
time (see program schedule - Fig. I.1). It is comprised of 
multiple elements, flight configurations and technical 
sub-systems and systems, resulting in complex hardware, 
software and management interfaces. 
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FIG. 1.1 COLUMBUS PROGRAM SCHEDULE 
These various elements and systems will have numerous 
interfaces - with each other, the U.S. Space Station, the NSTS, 
ARIANE 5, HERMES, TDRS, DRS, ESOC ·and others. In this respect, 
the compatibility of those buildin9 blocks which will 
eventually assure European autonomy in space, presents a 
special consideration. ARIANE s; '.HERMES, COLUMBUS, DRS and the 
associated ground installations, together form a truly coherent 
European Space System, which ~s.capable of not only placing 
into orbit its individual elements making up the space segment, 
but also of servicing those elements when required, man-tending 
those so designed for, trac~ing.them, and processing/con-
trolling on the ground informa~1on gathered in, and transmitted 
from, space. 
Due. to the tight cost anq schedule constraints and the unique 
conditions brought about by the.large number of international 
participants, those committed to the accomplishment of the 
European Space Station and Platform Program COLUMBUS also face 
a management challenge, rivalling the technical demands. 
6-2 
II. THE DEFINITION PROCESS 
A. The COLUMBUS Preparatory Program. The ensuing activity 
was the direct result of the Council decision of January 
1985. Under ESA management control and guidance, the 
program covers definition studies of specific European 
Space Station elements and flight configurations, which 
are to be proposed to the U.S. for an evolutionary 
development (including technological research for manned 
and unmanned systems). 
For the Space Segment, the Preparatory Program was divided 
into two phases: Bl and B2. The selection of a phased 
approach was based on the belief that, due to the 
magnitude and complexity of the program, major, defineable 
portions of the definition effort should be periodically 
reviewed for results, and an opportunity provided to the 
delegates of the member states to concur in the findings 
and to voice agreement for continuation along proposed 
paths. This approach, which characterizes the entire Phase 
B activities, has caused a natural "refining" process 
leading to a convergence from a large number of 
configuration and systems options to the baseline we have 
today, while at the same time, producing an expansion of 
technical and management details covering those elements 
and flight configurations we presently consider promising 
candidates for the European contribution to the U.S. Space 
Station. 
B. Phase Bl. Phase Bl of the COLUMBUS Preparatory Program 
started effectively with industrial contracts being placed 
by ESA in late spring 1985. Five elements were made 
subject to studies during this phase: 
• A Pressurized Module (PM) to be used as a manned 
laboratory, initially attached to the International 
Space Station, but capable of operating in a free 
flying mode. 
A Resource Module (RM), which would support the 
Pressurized Module during its free-flying mode. 
A Polar Platform (PPF), mainly devoted to earth 
observation. 
A Co-orbiting Platform, mainly dedicated to space 
sciences and micro-gravity research. 
A Service Vehicle, to intervene in a automated 
fashion on the various elements for servicing 
purposes. 
Some of the major objectives of Phase Bl were: 
• To accomplish the definition and preliminary 
design of the COLUMBUS elements selected for study, 
along with a definition of Initial Operating 
Capability (IOC) and Autonomous Operating Capability 
(AOC) concepts. 
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II. The Definition Process 
B. Phase Bl (cont'd) 
To establish a preliminary cost and study baseline 
for development and initial operation of the 
elements. 
To insure that the definition of the elements under 
study included growth potential and did not preclude 
further development into a coherent Autonomous 
European System. 
To assess potential teaming arrangements, proposed by 
industry for implementation during subsequent phases 
of the program. 
As mentioned before, a fundamental purpose of the 
definition phase is to continuously refine the options 
through a process of reduction/elimination, while 
simultaneously developing a larger amount of details for 
those options emerging as increasingly attractive. 
This task, Phase Bl accomplished excellently. Starting 
from an extreme number of options, configurations and 
launch/service combinations in August 1985, a reduction to 
11 options was achieved by November 1985, with a further 
reduction to one basic alignment of options arrived at by 
February '86. This "base1ine" was then again refined into 
a number of component elements, options and flight 
configurations. 
When we completed Phase Bl, we recommended the following 
scenario : 
e 4 Segment Pressurized Module, attached 
(Option: 3 Segment) 
e Polar Platform 
e Resource Module 
e 2 Segment 
Pressurized Module 
(Option: 3 Segment) 
Man Tended Free-Flyer (MTFF) 
e Optional Co-orbiting Platform 
(Enhanced EURECA) 
(see Fig. II.B.l, page 3A) 
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The Definition Process 
B. Phase Bl (cont'd) 
The criticality of the schedule caused ESA to select 
certain tasks for priority pre-Phase B2 work. This was 
done to maintain the industrial study momentum with a 
minimum of disturbance over the critical period following 
completion of Phase Bl in March 1986, through the 
following four months, i.e., the end of July 1986. 
II. The Definition Process 
c. Phase B2 
A series of significant technical and programmatic 
redirections were issued by ESA for Phase B2: 
• The Service Vehicle was removed from further study 
scope (in-orbit servicing can be achieved without a 
dedicated service vehicle, due to reduction in size 
and complexity of the polar platform). 
The study of the large Co-orbiting Platform was 
discontinued. 
The study of the optional Attached/Man-tended 
Free-flying mode of the Pressurized Module was 
discontinued. 
Space Segment infrastructure elements retained for further 
definition study were identified as follows: 
• A four-segment Pressurized Module for permanent 
attachment to the U.S. Space Station. 
A two-segment Pressurized Module for use as a 
man-tended free flying laboratory. 
A Resource Module to be used in conjunction with the 
two segment free-flying laboratory. 
An enhanced, ground based EURECA carrier as a small 
co-orbiting platform. 
ARIANE 5 as the reference launch vehicle for the 
Polar Platform and the Man-tended Free-Flyer (NSTS is 
retained as backup). 
HERMES as a support/service vehicle for the platform 
and the free flyer. (NSTS remains an option). 
Additional major objectives for Phase B2 are closely 
related to the technical definition tasks and are an 
integral part of the Phase B2 study plan. 
Industry was tasked to: 
&6 
The Definition Process 
c. Phase B2 (cont'd) 
• Generate a comprehensive programmatics data 
package for the implementation phase, including a 
proposed industrial structure and a cost/schedule 
estimate. 
• Retain program scope within the established Space 
Segment funding envelope of 1.9 BAU (P.B. '85), plus 
0.1 BAU's for the Enhanced EURECA 
Define the technical aspects of the chosen 
elements to sub-system level, generating preliminary 
designs, specifications and Key Program Plans. 
Support the European long term autonomy concept, 
by including ARIANE 5 and HERMES as key elements into 
the Space Segment definition work. 
Establish an industrial consortium, headed by the 
Prime Contractor MBB/ERNO, to carry out on behalf of 
ESA, the objectives for this program phase. 
Phase B2 Status 
-------------~---
At this point in time, we should highlight certain events 
which characterize the work we have accomplished so far 
during Phase B2: 
• Changed Polar Platform Systems Requir~me_!lj:.s 
Platform life requirements were reduced from 30 years 
to 8 years with a possibility of extension to 12 
years. The NSTS was deleted as a backup launch mode, 
while ARIANE 5 was assigned the task. There will be 
an on-orbit servicing of the platform by HERMES after 
4 years. As a result of these changes, payload mass 
was reduced from 2400 kg to 2000 kg, needing a 
correspondingly lower payload power. 
The new requirements have had a major impact on the 
reference design/commonality of the MTFF/PPF and 
resulted in the establishment of an MTFF/PPF 
commonality task force. 
~TFF[PPF Commonality Task Force 
The main objective of the task force was to find an 
optimum MTFF/PPF concept, including maximum 
commonality at equipment, subsystem and element 
levels and to reduce program cost. 
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Phase B2 Status 
MTFF/PPF Commonality Task Force (cont'd) 
To date, commonality applications have been achieved 
at these sub-system levels: EPS, CIMS, COMMS, GNC and 
certain propulsion components. Additionally, the 
level of commonality between PM-4 and PM-2 has 
improved. Finally, four concepts of the Resource 
Module design have been presented by the consortium 
to ESA. 
Financial Outlook 
Cost estimates projecting Phase C/D implementation 
are examined in the light of the ESA established 
space segment target of 2.0 BAU. At this point, 
forecast expenditure levels exceed ESA's target. We 
are in the process, however, of working a number of 
alternatives and options to reduce, or entirely 
eliminate, the variance. Some of the remedial 
measures under consideration are: 
•• Pursue commonality concepts at all levels 
•• Reduce new equipment development where possible, 
by relying on equipment available on the market 
•• Make extensive use of computer simulation 
•• Challenge cost driving requirements 
•• Design a common RM for PPF and MTFF 
III. '!'__~-~-~yo~pTJON OF THE INDUSTRIAL TEAM 
A. Phase Bl Contracts and Management Conc_~E:t:§ 
At the beginning of Phase Bl, ESA issued five separate 
contracts, to deal with the entire spectrum of definition 
tasks as they were then perceived. Contracts were issued 
to the following industrial organizations: 
• Aeritalia, Italy: Pressurized Module 
(integrated or attached to the Space Station and 
Man-tended Free Flyer) 
Aerospatiale, France: Service Vehicle (unmanned, 
later manned) 
British Aerospace, UK: Platforms (co-orbiting and 
polar) 
Dornier System, Germany: Resource modules {unmanned, 
man-tended) 
MBB/ERNO, Germany: System Contractor. 
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III. The Evolution of the Industrial Team 
A. Phase Bl Contracts and Management Concepts (cont'd) 
With this action, ESA was placed in the role of a multiple 
contract manager, facing the responsibility for managing 
all aspects (technical, management and cost) of these 
individual prime contracts and the numerous sub-contracts 
associated with each. Through a number of preplanned major 
milestone reviews, ESA monitored the progress made by the 
individual companies, evaluated the preliminary cost 
estimates derived for each individual element under study 
and tried to analyse and later integrate the activities, 
by the various prime contractors. 
Having successfully handled the many and varied tasks 
under the Phase Bl contractual requirements, ESA decided 
that for subsequent Program activities, industry should 
assume a greater role in managing responsibilities 
inherent in their individual assignments. Since proven 
capabilities existed in the European industrial community, 
the ESA decision to consider changes in the contracting 
approach was understandable. The thought of having such 
capabilities consolidated in a team under the leadership 
of a single industrial organization appeared to hold 
particular promise. 
Ever since the conceptual stages of the COLUMBUS Program, 
the idea of teaming among major European Aerospace 
companies was a cornerstone of management deliberations. 
The scope of the contemplated undertaking made it 
imperative to seek out and commit to an industrial team 
those companies, which had a proven track record and could 
be expected to contribute major efforts, technical skills, 
and management know-how to the emerging project. 
The companies which appeared in the forefront of the 
selective process, were those later on chosen by ESA to 
perform the tasks mentioned previously. Under Phase Bl 
however, while the roles of the companies had been 
established, the relationship towards each other remained 
casual and ,not very well defined. Since all held prime 
contracts, with a direct contractual relationship to ESA, 
but none to each other, coordination among the industrial 
companies was a matter more of voluntary cooperation, than 
one of legal necessity. 
This proved to be a particularly cumbersome experience for 
the then System Prime Contractor MBB/ERNO who, on one 
hand, had the task to maintain system cognizance and 
assure adherence by other prime contractors to general 
specifications, schedules and cost targets but, on the 
other hand, lacked contractu~l authority to demand 
compliance with plans and events as he saw them from a 
system viewpoint. Still, goodwill, based primarily on many 
long-term personal relationships between top managers in 
industry, ESA and other European national space 
organizations, brought about positive results. 
III. The Evolution of the Industrial Team 
A. Phase Bl Contracts and Management Concepts (cont'd) 
As Phase Bl progressed, the desirability for a change in 
the management approach became increasingly apparent. In a 
series of meetings, ESA considered this very important 
area and formalized their decision to select a prime 
contractor, responsible in principle for the efforts of 
several major element contractors. This would provide an 
efficient vehicle for ESA to exercise surveillance and 
control over the activities in the COLUMBUS Program and 
give the industrial organizations the opportunity to 
deliver products and services commensurate with ESA's 
expectation and in line with the established high 
technical and managerial standards resident in those 
organizations. 
B. Phase B2 Management Aspects 
With the beginning of Phase B2, ESA implemented its 
decision to change the contracting arrangements by 
accepting and employing the well tested concept of using 
an industrial prime contractor. ESA gained substantial 
benefits which are attendant to having one point of legal, 
financial, technical and programmatic interface during the 
critical periods of the projects B2 and CID phases. 
MBB/ERNO, the chosen prime contractor, proceeded to create 
a closely knit consortium comprised of Aeritalia, British 
Aerospace, Dornier System and MATRA (see Fig. III.B.1), 
pooling these companies' skills and experiences in such a 
fashion that the combined capabilities are available to 
ESA through the integrated effort and management authority 
of the Prime Contractor. The Agency's rights to continue 
monitoring, supervising and directing the Prime 
Contractor's and other contractors' performances were 
carefully preserved. This is considered a fundamental ESA 
prerogative, where the industrial team and the Agency are 
joined in a common understanding of each others roles. 
I 
AIT 
PRESSURIZED 
MODULES 
-ITALY-
FIG. 111.B.1 
r 
OS 
MBB/ERNO 
PRIME CONTRACTOR 
-GERMANY-
I 
I 
I 
BAe 
RESOURCE MODULE POLAR PLATFORM 
-GERMANY- -U.K.-
COLUMBUS INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 
6-10 
I 
MAT RA 
DATA MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM 
-FRANCE-
III. The Evolution of the Industrial Team 
B. Phase B2 Management Aspects (cont'd) 
It is interesting to note that the MBB/ERNO prime contract 
with ESA displays a combination of two major contractual 
features: MBB/ERNO is to carry out responsibilities under 
the contract for certain defined activities in its role as 
"Agent", and others in the well understood, classical 
concept of "Prime Contractor". 
This hybrid approach to the prime contract, while 
unorthodox, perhaps, to many observers, is based on very 
practical and solid considerations. The Prime Contractor, 
in many cases, would be exposed to unacceptable financial 
risks, if he were not to execute his contractual duties 
only as an ESA "Agent". Such risks could arise from 
decisions made by national delegates attached to ESA 
causing unexpected impacts on the Prime Contractor's 
activities with which he cannot cope. Additionally, ESA, 
as the executor of policy guidance received from delegates 
of the various national governments, must remain 
responsive to those instructions and capable of actively 
controlling and expeditiously changing the program and its 
major constituent parts. 
These thoughts then shape the relationship of not only the 
Prime Contractor to ESA, but also those of the Element 
Contractors to the Prime and, finally, ESA's relationship 
towards the members of the industrial consortium. While 
the Prime now has the responsibility to achieve, on behalf 
of ESA, the overall objectives set by the Agency and has 
been given contractual authority with which to steer the 
efforts of the other major contractors, the Agency demands 
a management system to be instituted which acknowledges 
the special positions it assigned to the hardware 
contractors within the consortium. 
The Project Managers at ESA, MBB/ERNO and Element/Common 
Subsystem Contractor, i.e. DMS, being faced with these 
conditions, have to address these major challenges: 
• Integration of a number of member states' 
industrial organizations which are contributing 
skills and resources to the program. 
• Handling each participant's need for detailed, 
accurate technical and programmatic information, 
particularly concerning interfaces. 
Establishing an efficient system which ensures that 
the exchange of information is accurate, capable of 
revision and subject to rapid dissemination. 
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III. The Evolution of the Industrial Team 
B. Phase B2 Management Aspects (cont'd) 
In order to safeguard the interests of ESA and the other 
major participants, provisions must also be made to 
accommodate ESA's special management requirements and the 
need for overall program visibility and availability of 
current information. 
It is intended to deal with this problem in the following 
ways: We must establish a system providing the widest 
possible contact between all those involved in the 
program. It must be insured that information flows both 
ways to and from ESA, MBB/ERNO, the element prime 
contractors and subcontractors. Management and technical 
boards will be responsible for implementation of these 
concepts and ESA's participation in an ex-officio role 
makes it possible for the Agency to remain fully cognizant 
of the contractors' activities. It is also important to 
pay particular attention to work being done in special 
areas, by establishing sub-groups to deal with 
particularly important matters. The fact that these 
sub-group meetings may be informal, fosters the free 
exchange of ideas and will contribute measurably to the 
success of the program. 
Availability and utilization of these data will allow 
higher management units to deal effectively with program 
problems and contribute to the dissemination of accurate 
technical information. 
Towards this end, a number of supervisory institutions 
will be set up to carry out the principles just described: 
• COLUMBUS Executive Board: It is made up of policy 
level, industry executives representing the Prime 
Contractor, Element Contractors and major Common 
Subsystem Contractors. These individuals will meet at 
regular intervals to be briefed on progress, problems 
or major issues concerning COLUMBUS. In turn, the 
Board will provide the project with advice and 
guidance and will accept for consideration, requests 
for major changes in the implementation of assigned 
tasks or re-direction of committed resources. 
• The Industrial Board of Directors (BOD): While 
France, Germany, Italy and the U.K. made by far the 
most dominant financial commitments, a number of 
other countries are also providing valuable skills 
and resources to the program. In the BOD, all members 
are joined at regular intervals to be briefed on the 
status of the project and to be given the opportunity 
to voice opinions, state concerns or bring 
recommendations to the attention of the group. 
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III. The Evolution of the Industrial Team 
B. Phase B2 Management Aspects (cont'd) 
• The ~OLUMBUS Project Management Board: It constitutes 
the project's senior management council. Chaired by 
the Prime Contractor's Project Manager, its members 
are the Element Contractors and major Common 
Subsystem Contractors Project Managers. ESA will be 
represented as permanent members on the Board. The 
Board is a forum for all team members' senior 
managers to deal with both programmatic as well as 
with technical issues. The Board's activity provides 
visibility about essential prbgram matters to all 
members and avoids uncoordinated policy decisions, 
which could adversely impact schedules, financial 
targets or technical performance. 
CO~Ql'.!~US _ §_ystems Engineering Board: Chaired by the 
MBB/ERNO Engineering Manager, the membership will 
comprise representatives from technical functional 
departments, element and major system contractors. 
ESA will participate in this Board at their 
discretion. The prime function of the Board is to 
insure the technical integrity of the project, 
develop concepts and then monitor adherence to those 
technical approaches, maintain control over 
specifications and requirements. The Board will be 
tasked to see to the implementation of commonality 
and modularity concepts. 
Decisions of the Systems Engineering Board will be 
taken to the Configuration Control Board for 
baselining as required. 
The major areas of visibility and communications flow are 
addressed through a number of practices devised to insure 
that the industrial members of the team, as well as ESA, 
are provided with up to date information on program 
developments. ESA will be afforded full access and 
information without exclusion. The Agency will receive 
information in parallel to information flowing normally 
between the Prime Contractor and his team partners. The 
proposed COLUMBUS-wide Management and Technical 
Information System (MATIS) is intended to eventually 
interconnect ESA and all other major program participants. 
All participants will have access to data of common 
interest. The system will essentially be one for 
controlling and coordinating the storage, retrieval, 
consolidation and exchange of data from a common data 
base. Both engineering and management data will be 
subjected to it. Participating contractors' existing 
hardware and software infrastructure will be utilized to 
the extent feasible. Where necessary, contractors will 
tailor their in-house systems to meet the MATIS 
specifications. 
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III. The Evolution of the Industrial Team 
B. Phase B2 Management Aspects (cont'd) 
During Phase B2, requirements will be collected, system 
needs will be defined and implementation of initial 
features and capabilities will be achieved. Additional 
functions will be implemented in later phases of the 
program. To further enhance visibility, a system of formal 
progress and special reviews, some of them with ESA 
participation, has been established. The purpose of these 
reviews will be to evaluate progress made toward planned 
objectives and schedules, look at the present technical 
status, review plans and procedures for future work and 
identify problems, issues and concerns. These meetings are 
in addition to other in-house as well as joint meetings at 
working group levels called for special purposes at the 
request of ESA or any member of the consortium. 
There are a number of more traditional management control 
tools already established. They will monitor, guide, and 
control activities by the participants to ensure 
compliance with all contractual requirements. They are 
well known in any government/industrial environment and 
shall not be addressed here. 
The evolution of the industrial team and the placement of 
common management concepts among the consortium has been -
and continues to be - a matter of prime importance. The 
chain of responsibility and authority is now well 
understood and documented in ESA's Matrix of 
Responsibility for B2. The relationship among the major 
consortium team members has matured, with management tasks 
being handled in concert with ESA to produce the results 
industry committed itself to delivery. 
IV. THE COMMONALITY ISSUE - A KEY TO SUCCESS 
A. Effects on the Design Process 
Commonality and its potential benefits to COLUMBUS have 
had an influence on design considerations since the 
inception of Phase Bl. Even before more extensive 
investigations confirmed the substantial importance of 
commonality applications, it was believed that the 
commonality issue would be a key feature of the COLUMBUS 
Element design process. A number of reasons surfaced: 
e Commonality and interchangeability may lead to a 
reduction of cost and risk for development, 
production and qualification. 
e Commonality and interchangeability may simplify 
operations, logistics and maintenance. 
Standardization of operational procedures and 
interfaces may increase safety. 
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IV. The Commonality Issue - A Key to Success 
A. Effects on the Design Process (cont'd) 
• Common hardware for major COLUMBUS subsystems may 
reduce the number of spares that need to be carried 
on-board and may thus increase available space and 
payload capacity for user facilities, experiments or 
crew. 
There are, of course, a number of other factors which 
could be added. Suffice it to say that commonality has 
been accepted as a major item in the Design Process. 
B. Effects on Hardware 
It must be realized that the application of commonality 
principles will affect not only the product of one 
company, but will have a snowball effect on the integrated 
element, product of many companies, then the combined 
elements comprising the European Space Segment and 
ultimately the hardware of other, non-European, origin, 
i.e., the U.S., Japan and Canada. Viewed in this light, we 
must always evaluate potential benefits achievable through 
the application of commonality principles as they affect -
positively or negatively - : 
• Internal commonality between items within one 
COLUMBUS Element. 
Extended Commonality, which crosses the limits of one 
element and affects others within the European Space 
Segment. 
External commonality, i.e. interrelationship with 
non-European elements or interfaces, such as the U.S. 
Space Station components. 
No matter how beneficial a proposed commonality suggestion 
may be on a single application basis, it must only be 
considered in the context of the total effect, since a 
savings that cannot be utilized by virtue of 
incompatibility of design with others, is a failure, when 
viewed from an overall program standpoint. 
In general, we believe that a systematic application of 
commonality and standardization concepts will lead to a 
multitude of beneficial results, among them: 
• Reduction of distinct hardware and software items. 
• Interchangeability of items. 
• Increased confidence in the success of the 
development and production program. 
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IV. The Commonality Issue - A Key to Success 
B. Effects on Hardware (cont'd) 
• Optimum utilization of program funds, skilled 
manpower resources and, possible, COLUMBUS associated 
ground facilities. 
Regardless how closely knit the relationship is between 
European partners and ESA, the nature of COLUMBUS introduces an 
additional dimension: International, i.e. U.S. and other 
non-European interfaces. 
We must build on experiences gained with Spacelab, SPAS, the Dl 
mission and EURECA and strive for solution of previously 
unresolved problems, such as: 
• the need for reciprocity of cooperation 
• the creation of a relationship of equality between 
partners, fairly assigning rights and obligations 
increased and unencumbered access to, and 
dissemination of, information and its exchange 
between US and European contractors 
the application of commonality and technical 
management information system concepts across 
international interfaces. To restrict commonality and 
MATIS to the European contribution to the 
International Space Station would be just as 
shortsighted as withholding US TMIS concepts from 
other Space Station partners. 
As the consequences of changing international interfaces can 
have substantial effects on cost, schedules and resources, NASA 
and ESA with their decision making authority must reach 
agreement on the method of handling these changes, so as not to 
expose their respective industrial organizations to sudden and 
unacceptable cost and schedule impacts. 
A. The Building Blocks 
The decisions leading to the selection of the major 
components making up an eventual Autonomous European space 
capability were guided by the necessity to define a 
coherent, self-supporting and self-sustaining system, 
based on reliability, self-sufficiency and long-term 
utilization. 
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VI. Achieving System Coherence 
A. The Building Blocks (cont'd) 
We believe the building blocks making up such a system 
have been identified and are now methodically being 
realized under ESA control, with the approval and guidance 
of the national delegates. 
We see the system as consisting of: 
• ARIANE 5 launchers 
• HERMES Space Transportation System 
• COLUMBUS with its elements and flight configurations 
• Data Relay Satellite 
• European Space Operations Center 
• Other ground facilities and installations 
With the completion of the individual systems, a coherent, 
interactive total program capability will have been 
created that assures permanent, independent European 
presence in space. 
B. The ESA/Industry Closed Loop Approach 
We firmly believe that the achievement of the goals set 
for COLUMBUS as a part of such a functioning, coherent 
European Program, will depend to a major extent on the 
ability of management - both in ESA and in industry - to 
formulate its policies and approaches on the basis of a 
continued, close association and the attendant free and 
unencumbered exchange of information. The continuous data 
exchange - as we stated earlier - a flow of information, 
to and from all members of the consortium and ESA, will 
ensure the soundness of the decisions taken to steer the 
Program and its direction. Full cooperation between ESA 
and industry is a traditional feature in our relationship. 
Our recognition of ESA as the Agency ultimately 
responsible for the Program is a natural consequence of 
the multi-national character of our endeavour. These 
concepts shape the decision making process which provides 
purpose and direction to the overall program. 
C. ~ication of Experience from Past Programs 
Both technical and management experience gained from other 
programs will be examined and applied to COLUMBUS, if 
appropriate. SPACELAB, SPAS, the German Dl Mission, 
EURECA; they all have provided information on subjects 
that resurface in COLUMBUS on a larger scale. 
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VI. Achieving System Coherence 
c. Application of Experience from Past Programs (cont'd) 
It has become clear that information access, processing 
and transfer among all parties is one of the most 
important items assuring coherence of not only the 
European Space Segment, but also the entire International 
Space Station. 
We have learned that Joint Working Groups provide the best 
means to resolve common program concerns and contribute to 
the success of the overall project. We also have 
established, that the Single Project Manager Concept, 
embodied in the Prime Contractor philosophy, is an 
efficient method to accomplish our goals. 
In the area of international relations, we have gained the 
insight that an MOU can establish the framework of initial 
commitments, but it cannot identify, anticipate and 
resolve the many problems attendant to the execution of a 
complex, multi-national program. 
On that basis, we have concluded that goodwill and the 
spirit to succeed must, and will, remain the underlying 
force in the relationship among all the partners. 
VI. SUMMARY 
The COLUMBUS Program still moves in an evolutionary environment 
with options to be investigated, defined and decided on during 
the coming months. 
The decisions which Space Segment elements will finally 
constitute COLUMBUS and provide in its total outlook for a 
coherent, balanced approach, is planned for spring 1987. Europe 
will bring to bear its combined experience gained over the past 
two decades in manned as well as unmanned space undertakings, 
to meet the technical and management challenge of the European 
Space Station and Platform Program. Its realization will 
require all our technical imagination, intuition and trade-offs 
regarding schedule and cost. 
We are ready to meet this challenge. 
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